Inside the Mind of the Adversary: Unmasking Credential Access Attacks — A Four-Part Deep Dive Series

---

Credential Access Attack Trends: 2024-2025 Analysis & Q4 2025 Projections

Executive Summary

Credential access attacks have evolved significantly in 2025. Threat actors are now focusing their efforts into short, high-intensity campaigns during the summer months. The education sector has become the primary target, experiencing a 226% surge in attacks, while the banking and finance sector saw a 40% decline. Password spraying incidents have tripled compared to last year, and nearly half of all annual credential-based attacks now occur between July and September.

Monthly Attack Patterns: The Summer Surge



2024: Steady Year-Round Activity

In 2024, credential access attacks were distributed evenly across the year, ranging between 6.6 - 9.98% per month. Threat actors maintained consistent operations with little seasonal fluctuation. Quarterly data reflected this balance, with Q1 accounting for 26.03% of total alerts, Q2 at 20.83%, Q3 at 27.04%, and Q4 at 26.10%. These figures highlighted a constant operational tempo rather than any targeted campaign periods.

2025: Concentrated Summer Offensive

By contrast, 2025 introduced a pronounced shift in attacker behavior. Credential access incidents became heavily concentrated during the summer, with July through September now representing 48.04% of all alerts—an increase of nearly 78% compared to the same period in 2024.

Several months showed dramatic year-over-year changes. January rose to 13.30%, a 37.5% increase. March climbed sharply to 13.86%, nearly doubling the previous year's volume. June dropped to 3.18%, the lowest monthly total, but this lull set the stage for a dramatic surge. July became the single most active month at 17.70%, followed by August at 16.20% and September at 14.14%.

Why Summer Matters

The concentration of attacks during the summer is no coincidence. Threat actors exploit the seasonal conditions that weaken organizational defenses. Security teams often operate with reduced staffing as personnel take vacations, while employees are generally less attentive to cybersecurity practices during the mid-year period. Adversaries also use this time to harvest credentials that can be exploited later in the year, when organizations are busier and detection is more difficult.

High attack volumes during the summer further strain under-resourced teams, allowing credential testing and brute force attempts to blend into background noise. This creates an ideal environment for attackers to achieve initial access, establish persistence, and prepare for follow-on activity such as lateral movement or data exfiltration.

The pattern emerging in 2025 underscores a key reality: credential access attacks are not random, but increasingly strategic. Recognizing these temporal trends is essential for anticipating threat actor behavior and reinforcing defenses before the next seasonal surge begins.

Industry Targeting: The Education Explosion



The Education Sector Surge

The education sector experienced the most significant transformation in 2025, with credential access attacks rising by 226%—from 6.60% in 2024 to 21.52% in 2025. This dramatic increase made education the most targeted industry, surpassing banking and finance for the first time. Threat actors have increasingly recognized that educational institutions often operate with weaker security controls, limited

cybersecurity budgets, and sprawling digital ecosystems. These environments hold valuable research data, intellectual property, and large volumes of student financial and personal information. Additionally, the widespread use of remote learning systems and shared credentials increases exposure, allowing compromises to persist undetected for months or even years.

Banking & Finance Decline

Although banking and finance remained a major target at 18.80% of total activity, the sector saw a 40% reduction from its 2024 high of 31.37%. This decline reflects significant progress in the industry's defensive posture. The widespread adoption of phishing-resistant multifactor authentication has made credential exploitation more difficult, while enhanced fraud detection systems now identify and respond to suspicious activity more rapidly. Strong regulatory oversight and continuous security investments have further strengthened financial institutions' ability to detect and contain credential-based attacks before they can escalate.

Other Industry Trends

Manufacturing maintained a nearly steady level of targeting, accounting for 15.98% of attacks in 2025 compared to 16.04% in 2024. This consistency suggests that adversaries continue to see strong returns from targeting the sector's combination of valuable intellectual property, access to operational technology, and deep integration across supply chains.

The healthcare sector saw a notable 59.4% increase in credential access activity, climbing from 4.48% in 2024 to 7.14% in 2025. Attackers are drawn to the high value of electronic health record data and the sector's ongoing reliance on legacy systems with outdated authentication mechanisms. Credential theft has also become a favored initial intrusion method for healthcare-related ransomware operations.

The construction sector, on the other hand, experienced a 35.8% decline in targeting, dropping from 8.65% to 5.55%. This reduction may reflect improvements in email security and payment authorization controls, both of which have historically been exploited in credential-based fraud schemes.

Software companies faced a sharp rise in attacks, nearly doubling from 3.46% in 2024 to 6.67% in 2025. This trend suggests growing threat actor interest in compromising development environments, where stolen credentials can be used to conduct supply chain attacks by inserting malicious code into trusted software products.

Overall, the 2025 landscape reveals that attackers are adapting quickly—shifting focus toward sectors with weaker controls, valuable data, and exploitable authentication practices—while industries with stronger defenses are beginning to see measurable benefits from their investments in identity security.

Attack Methods: MITRE Techniques Analysis

Password Spraying Emerges as the Dominant Credential Access Method

Password Spraying (T1110.003) experienced explosive growth in 2025, surging from 147 occurrences in 2024 to 427 occurrences, representing a 190% increase. This technique has become the primary method for credential access attacks, as threat actors recognize its ability to evade detection. Password spraying works by testing a small set of commonly used or previously compromised passwords across many accounts, keeping attempts below lockout thresholds that trigger security alerts. Unlike traditional brute force attacks, which flood a single account with repeated guesses, password spraying distributes attempts across multiple accounts, blending into normal failed login traffic and avoiding most monitoring systems.

At the same time, the broader Brute Force category (T1110) declined from 610 occurrences in 2024 to 218 through September 2025. This drop does not indicate a reduction in threat activity but reflects a shift toward more efficient and targeted password spraying techniques. The 2025 campaign model emphasizes precision over volume, allowing attackers to achieve higher success rates during strategically timed operations.

Top Credential Access Techniques: 2024 vs 2025

Rank	2025 Technique	Count	2024 Technique	Count
1	T1110.003 Password Spraying	427	T1110 Brute Force	610
2	T1110 Brute Force	218	T1110.003 Password Spraying	147
3	T1078 Valid Accounts	46	T1550.001 App Access Tokens	70
4	T1598.001 Spearphishing Service	39	T1110.001 Password Guessing	39
5	T1003 OS Credential Dumping	38	T1078 Valid Accounts	37

Credential Harvesting Evolution

The use of Valid Accounts (T1078) increased from 37 occurrences in 2024 to 46 in 2025, a 24% growth. This technique allows attackers to authenticate using legitimate credentials, making detection extremely challenging because the access appears authorized. This increase demonstrates that concentrated campaign windows are achieving higher success rates in compromising accounts.

Spearphishing for credentials (T1598.001) also gained prominence in 2025, appearing 39 times. This method involves sending targeted phishing messages to specific individuals to capture credentials, often preceding broader password spraying campaigns.

Post-Compromise Credential Extraction

OS Credential Dumping (T1003) remained consistent, with 36 occurrences in 2024 and 38 in 2025 through September. After gaining initial access, attackers extract additional credentials stored on compromised systems. DCSync (T1003.006), a sub-technique targeting Active Directory domain controllers, appeared 21 times in 2024, allowing attackers to impersonate domain controllers and obtain all domain credentials at once.

Techniques targeting password stores (T1555) remained stable, with 37 occurrences in 2024 and 35 in 2025. Sub-techniques such as extracting browser-stored credentials (T1555.003) appeared 26 times in 2024 and 17 in 2025, reflecting ongoing exploitation of credentials saved for convenience in browsers and password managers.

Persistence and Defense Evasion

Account Manipulation (T1098) increased from 11 occurrences in 2024 to 17 in 2025, a 55% rise. This technique involves modifying compromised accounts to add alternate authentication methods, change recovery options, or create backdoor access, ensuring persistence even after password resets.

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (T1547) more than doubled, from 5 occurrences to 12, demonstrating attackers' efforts to maintain credential harvesting capabilities across system restarts.

Man-in-the-Middle attacks (T1557.001) appeared 14 times in 2025, capturing credentials in transit between users and authentication systems during login processes.

Application Access Token Decline
Application Access Tokens (T1550.001) saw a sharp decrease from 70 occurrences in 2024 to minimal activity in 2025, a 93% reduction. This decline reflects stronger token security across cloud platforms, including shorter lifespans, hardware-bound authentication, and continuous validation. Multi-Factor Authentication Interception (T1111), which appeared 32 times in 2024, has largely been supplanted by password spraying methods that target accounts without MFA enabled, bypassing the need for token theft altogether.

Understanding Threat Actors in Credential Access Attacks
In the evolving landscape of cyber threats, understanding the differences between various threat actor types is critical for defending against credential access attacks. While many attackers attempt to compromise accounts, the motivations, resources, and operational approaches differ significantly, shaping both the scale and impact of attacks.

Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) represent the most sophisticated credential access attackers, often backed by nation-states or well-funded organizations. Their objectives extend beyond financial gain to include espionage, intellectual property theft, and disruption of critical infrastructure. APT operations are meticulously planned, frequently involving long-term reconnaissance and multi-stage attack chains in which credential access serves as a critical first step. Techniques include spear-phishing targeted individuals, harvesting credentials from high-value accounts, and stealthy post-compromise actions like extracting domain credentials via DCSync (T1003.006). Groups such as APT28 and APT29 operate with extensive resources, allowing them to maintain undetected access for months or even years.

Cybercriminals
In contrast, traditional cybercriminals primarily focus on rapid financial gain. Credential access attacks by this group often rely on mass password spraying (T1110.003), credential stuffing, and the exploitation of accounts without multi-factor authentication. Attacks are opportunistic and high-volume, targeting many accounts across industries with lower technical sophistication than APTs. Success is measured by immediate monetization, such as stolen login credentials, credit card details, or ransomware deployment. Cybercriminals prioritize volume over precision, often using off-the-shelf tools and automated attacks.

Hacktivists
Hacktivists conduct credential access attacks with ideological or political motivations rather than financial incentives. Their targets are chosen for symbolic or reputational impact, including government agencies, corporations, or organizations associated with controversial causes. While less persistent than APTs, hacktivists may employ moderately sophisticated methods, often pairing targeted social engineering with public disclosure of compromised credentials to advance their agenda. Groups like Anonymous exemplify this approach, focusing on impact rather than stealth or long-term access.

Cyber Mercenaries
Cyber mercenaries or hackers-for-hire represent a professionalized category of credential access attackers. Operating on behalf of paying clients, they offer advanced capabilities comparable to APTs but with flexible targeting aligned with contractual objectives. These actors maintain strict operational security and compartmentalization, making attribution difficult. Their work often includes custom credential

harvesting campaigns, sophisticated post-compromise persistence, and evasion of detection systems, supporting activities for governments, corporations, or high-net-worth individuals.

Organized Crime Syndicates
Sophisticated organized crime groups have emerged as persistent players in credential access attacks. Unlike opportunistic cybercriminals, these syndicates operate with defined hierarchies, specialized teams, and sustained infrastructure. They leverage stolen credentials to conduct extended campaigns, often across specific industries, and integrate attacks with financial fraud or Ransomware-as-a-Service operations. Notable groups include Wizard Spider, Evil Corp, and FIN7, whose credential access campaigns have caused global disruption and substantial financial losses.

Insider Threats
Compromised or malicious insiders present a unique challenge in credential access defense. With legitimate system access and knowledge of organizational controls, insiders can either intentionally or unintentionally facilitate credential compromise. This threat bridges external and internal attack vectors, making detection challenging and often requiring behavioral analytics and real-time monitoring to identify unusual activity.

Comparative Overview of Threat Actors in Credential Access Attacks

Characteristic	APTs	Cybercriminals	Hacktivists	Cyber Mercenaries	Organized Crime
Credential Access Techniques	Highly targeted, multi-stage	Mass password spraying, credential stuffing	Moderate, cause-specific	Sophisticated, client-directed	Structured, persistent campaigns
Resources	Extensive	Limited	Variable	Extensive	Substantial
Persistence	Months to years	Days to weeks	Variable	Contract-dependent	Months
Motivation	Espionage, disruption	Financial gain	Ideological causes	Contractual objectives	Financial gain
Common Targets	Government, critical infrastructure	Broad consumer base	Symbolic targets	Client-selected	High-value businesses

Emerging Trends
Credential access attacks continue to evolve. AI-driven techniques now generate highly convincing credential harvesting attempts at scale. Supply chain targeting enables attackers to compromise multiple organizations via a single trusted vendor. Mobile platforms have become key attack vectors, and multi-platform attacks combining email, SMS, voice, and social media are increasing in sophistication. These developments make recognizing attacker profiles and tailoring defense strategies critical for organizational resilience.

Strategic Implications
Effective defense against credential access attacks requires understanding the distinct approaches of

each threat actor type. Organizations must adopt a multi-layered strategy, including phishing-resistant authentication, continuous monitoring of credential usage, zero-trust access models, and targeted user awareness programs. Recognizing attacker behavior, persistence, and motivation enables security teams to implement controls that anticipate threats rather than react to breaches, creating a stronger security posture across all account-based vulnerabilities.

When Attacks Happen: Timing Patterns

Day of Week Patterns



The transition from end-of-week to early-week attack concentration in 2025 reveals a deliberate change in threat actor strategy. Whereas 2024 activity peaked on Fridays, attackers now front-load their efforts, targeting organizations earlier in the workweek when credential harvesting yields the highest operational value.

Early-week exploitation of cognitive and operational weaknesses:
The Monday surge, which now represents 18.16% of weekly attacks, suggests adversaries are exploiting the psychological and procedural vulnerabilities that occur when employees return from weekends. During this period, workers often prioritize clearing email backlogs and resuming unfinished tasks, leading to reduced scrutiny of login prompts, password resets, and document-sharing requests. Phishing emails or fake authentication pages are particularly effective at this time, as users are more likely to click quickly without verification.

Midweek pressure points and operational overload:
The secondary spike on Wednesday (18.35%) corresponds to a period of intense workload and multitasking across most organizations. Employees are deep into weekly deliverables, leadership meetings, and project deadlines. Threat actors capitalize on this midweek distraction to deliver credential harvesting campaigns, simulate legitimate business requests, or launch password spraying operations when users are least likely to notice authentication anomalies.

Automated weekend persistence:
Despite human-centric targeting early in the week, weekend activity remains consistently high at around

15% to 16%. This pattern underscores the persistence of automated attack infrastructure—botnets and credential testing scripts that operate continuously regardless of business hours. These operations often probe authentication portals, cloud services, and VPN endpoints, taking advantage of lighter weekend monitoring and delayed incident response times.

Strategic implications for defenders:
Organizations can use these insights to realign security operations. Increasing authentication monitoring and phishing detection from Monday through Wednesday, especially during morning shifts, can significantly reduce exposure. Weekend monitoring coverage should also include automated alert tuning and bot mitigation strategies to detect continuous password spraying or brute force attempts. Recognizing that attacker timing mirrors workforce behavior enables defenders to anticipate rather than react.

Hour-of-Day Patterns



The clustering of credential access activity between 1400 - 1900 UTC demonstrates how threat actors optimize their campaigns to coincide with global business hours. Rather than operating randomly, adversaries calibrate their attacks to align with moments of maximum human engagement and minimum alertness.

Exploiting global workday overlaps:
The 1400–1900 UTC window corresponds to the start of the North American time zones (0600 - 1100 PST / 0900 - 1400 EST), the midpoint of the European afternoon, and the evening hours across the Asia-Pacific region. This alignment allows attackers to reach multiple geographic targets simultaneously while blending into legitimate network traffic. As employees log in, respond to emails, and authenticate across cloud platforms, attackers inject phishing attempts, initiate password sprays, or replay stolen tokens during the natural surge of user activity—making malicious logins harder to distinguish from normal behavior.

Morning fatigue and early operational gaps:
The 1100–1200 UTC spike, though smaller, carries strategic importance. It aligns with early morning hours in North America and midday in Europe—two periods marked by reduced vigilance. In North America, many security operations centers (SOCs) are still ramping up staffing levels, while European

employees are multitasking during lunch breaks. Attackers exploit this lull to conduct low-and-slow testing or to deliver phishing campaigns that go unnoticed until after peak hours.

Low-activity hours and operational concealment:
From 0000 to 1000 UTC, activity drops to 1–2% per hour. This suggests attackers intentionally avoid off-hour windows when unusual login attempts stand out more clearly in authentication logs. These quiet periods likely serve as operational reset times, during which automated tools collect data from earlier campaigns, refine credential lists, and prepare for the next coordinated burst.

Operational and defensive implications:
Defenders can strengthen response posture by mapping authentication anomalies against these temporal trends. For example, increasing analyst coverage between 1300 and 2000 UTC ensures better real-time detection during peak attack hours. Automated anomaly detection systems should also flag login attempts that cluster around typical phishing deployment windows or originate from unusual IP ranges during known high-risk periods.

The broader takeaway:
Credential access operations follow a rhythm that mirrors human productivity cycles. Threat actors have become adept at timing their attacks to coincide with moments of distraction, high workload, or reduced staffing. By analyzing attack timing across both daily and weekly intervals, organizations can adapt defense schedules, tune alert systems to temporal risk, and shift from reactive defense to predictive readiness.

Q4 2025 Projections

Expected Attack Levels
Based on observed trends and temporal patterns, credential access activity in the fourth quarter of 2025 is expected to account for approximately 24-30% of annual alerts. October is projected to represent 10-12% of total activity as threat actors transition from summer harvesting campaigns to the active exploitation of compromised accounts. This represents a potential increase of up to 20% compared to October 2024. November is expected to account for 8-10% of activity, coinciding with the holiday season and heightened year-end financial operations. December is projected at 6-8%, reflecting reduced activity similar to the prior year as organizations implement heightened security measures for the year-end period.

Why Q4 Matters
The credentials compromised during the July through September summer campaigns provide attackers with a strategic advantage for year-end exploitation. Organizations face increased operational pressure during this period, including transaction processing, reporting deadlines, and staff shortages. Threat actors leverage previously stolen credentials to execute fraudulent financial transactions, exfiltrate sensitive data before credential rotation or policy enforcement, and establish persistent backdoor access ahead of detection efforts. The timing of these campaigns demonstrates a deliberate approach, aligning attacker activity with periods when organizations are most vulnerable and least able to respond effectively.

Industry Projections for Q4

Education is expected to remain heavily targeted, with 18-20% of attacks focused on the sector. While December holidays reduce day-to-day academic activity, ongoing research grant deadlines and spring semester enrollment create continued opportunities for credential-based exploitation.

Banking and Finance may see an increase to 20-22% relative to the 2025 average. Year-end reporting, holiday transaction volumes, and bonus payment processing create high-value opportunities for attackers to exploit previously harvested credentials.

Healthcare is likely to experience an increase to 8-10% due to open enrollment periods, year-end insurance claim processing, and heightened staffing pressures during flu season. Credential access provides an efficient initial vector for attacks, including ransomware or data exfiltration, in environments where legacy systems and high-value records are prevalent.

Overall, Q4 activity reflects a strategic shift from credential collection to active exploitation. Organizations should anticipate and mitigate attacks by reviewing summer-compromised accounts, enforcing credential rotation, and enhancing monitoring during peak operational periods.

Conclusion

The evolution of credential access attacks between 2024 and 2025 reflects a fundamental shift in how threat actors operate. Rather than maintaining steady, year-round activity, attackers have moved toward concentrated summer campaigns, demonstrating greater sophistication in planning and strategic exploitation of organizational vulnerabilities.

The Education sector has emerged as a primary focus, experiencing a 226% increase in attacks, while password spraying incidents have tripled. These trends indicate that attackers now prioritize targets that are easier to compromise over those with higher immediate data value. Educational institutions, with weaker defenses and slower detection capabilities, offer greater long-term returns despite having lower per-credential value than highly protected financial institutions.

As organizations enter Q4 2025, urgency is heightened. Threat actors are positioned to exploit credentials stolen during the July-September summer campaigns for year-end financial fraud, data theft, and persistent access. The window for identifying and remediating these compromises is closing quickly, particularly as holiday staffing reductions and end-of-year financial processes create heightened vulnerability.

Success in this environment requires moving beyond reactive incident response toward proactive security strategies that anticipate attacker behavior. Organizations must implement phishing-resistant authentication, behavioral analytics that detect unusual credential activity, and zero-trust architectures to limit the impact of inevitable compromises. Credential security becomes effective when it is sufficiently robust to force attackers to abandon these accounts in favor of weaker targets.

Looking ahead to 2026, organizations should prepare for continued evolution in threat actor tactics. Multiple concentrated campaign periods may target seasonal vulnerabilities, AI-driven attacks could leverage large language models to craft highly personalized phishing campaigns, and early attempts at exploiting weaknesses in credential systems may accelerate ahead of quantum-resistant authentication adoption. Organizations that recognize authentication as their primary security control and invest accordingly will build resilience against the broad spectrum of cyber threats that rely on credential compromise as a foundational attack vector.